Home Paper #15969 — Zeequent Batch Auctions: Providing Transparency and Fairness with Zero Knowledge Proofs
Research Paper

Zeequent Batch Auctions: Providing Transparency and Fairness with Zero Knowledge Proofs

KE
Kimia Esmaili ✉ corr. Concordia University
JC
Jeremy Clark Concordia University
EV
Elizabeth van Oorschot McGill University
Received 2026-03-12
Accepted 2026-04-10
3 authors

Frequent batch auctions (FBAs) have been proposed as an alternative to traditional limit order books for trading securities. The motivation is to mitigate the predatory advantages of high-frequency traders (HFTs). With FBAs, a double-sided auction is held over a short interval (e.g., 1 second). All marketable orders submitted during the time window are executed at the same price, and arrival time is not a factor. FBAs are significantly less transparent than continuous-time orderbooks and rely on fully trusted specialists or exchanges to execute orders at the fairest price. In this research, we apply the cryptographic concept of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to develop a zk-FBA which enables the specialist to prove trades are executed fairly without revealing any of the orders directly. Our zk-FBA is implemented using modern ZKP techniques: as a custom zk-SNARK. (Full 5-page paper will be uploaded soon)

FBAsclearing priceSNARKsHFTs.